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INTER1NATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPIiENT
REPORT AND RECO1RJ1NDATION OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED LOAN TO
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR A HIGHWAY PROJECT
1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed
loan to the Republic of Korea for the equivalent of US$54.5 million, with
interest at 7:% per annum and repayable in 24 years including a four year
period of grace. The loan would help finance the construction of
national highways; feasibility studies and detailed engineering; a
highway maintenance study; and the purchase of equipment and spare parts
for a pilot highway maintenance organization. The loan would also re-
finance a $3.5 million IDA technical assistance credit made in 1968.
PART I - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS
2. Korea has received six IDA credits totalling $65 million and
five Bank loans amounting to $140 million. The largest share of Bank
Group financing, $83.2 million, has gone to the transport sector, prac-
tically all of it for the railways. The proposed highway loan would
increase the Bank Groupts financing of this sector to $134.2 million,
with ;o79.7 million for railways and $54.5 million for highways. The
Korea Development Finance Corporation (KDFC) has received $55 millior
in Bank loans for relending to private industrial enterprises. Two
operations in the agricultural sector and one credit for education make
up the balance of Bank Group lending to Korea.
3. Of the total Bank Group lending of `205 million, $158.9 million
remained undisbursed as of May 31, 1971. This relatively large amount
is accounted for, in part, by two large loans made within the past year
and, in part, by delays in implementing a $45 million irrigation loan
and a $14.8 million education credit. It took longer than expected for
the Borrower to engage consultants for the irrigation project, and the
original Borrower was succeeded by a new organization about whose com-
petence the Bank had to satisfy itself. Several major contracts have
now been awarded and disbursements to cover civil works and equipment
expenditures can be expected to pick up within the next few months.
The appointment of consultants for the education project was delayed,
holding up design work; however, the project is now under way and dis-
bursements are expected to start in the near future.
4. During the next fiscal year, I expect to recommend Bank loans
for a fifth railway and a second irrigation project, and an IDA credit
for an agricultural credit project. These two agricultural projects
will increase our contribution to the agricultural sector which, as
explained in Part II, requires heavy additional investments.
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5. IFC has made three investments in Korea and its holdings amount
to $7.4 million in loans and shares. IFC is presently considering an
investment in the shares of the Korea Investment and Finance Corporation,
a new financial institution which will assist the development of the
capital and money markets in Korea. Further investment possibilities
are being investigated by IFC. A statement of Bank loans, IDA credits
and IFC investments is given in Annex I.
PART II - THE ECONO0IY
6. A report entitled "Economic Position and Prospects of the
Republic of Korea" (EAP-12a, dated 1\Iarch 16, 1970) was circulated to the
Executive Directors on March 27, 1970. Basic data on the country is
given in Annex II. An economic mission will leave for Korea in a few
days to review the forthcoming Third Five-Year Plan, 1972-76, and to
prepare an economic report which will be considered by the Consultative
Group in October 1971. The first formal meeting of the Consultative
Group was held in Paris in 1966 and there have been regular meetings
since that date, usually once a year.
7. Stable political conditions and a commitment to development
have provided a climate favorable to economic progress. Ethnic and
religious differences are largely absent from the Korean social scene,
thus conserving the remarkable energy of the prople for a single-minded
national effort to improve their standard of living. The Government
has recently won renewed support; in April, President Chung Hee Park
was elected to a third four-year term as President, and in May the
President's Democratic Republican Party won a majority in the National
Assembly.
8. Rapid economic growth, with strong emphasis on industriali-
zation and exports,has been a basic objective of the Government's policy.
This objective has been effectively fostered by Government policies of
active encouragement of private business, and by a well-educated, dis-
ciplined and low-wage labor force. Agricultural production has advanced
at the fairly satisfactory rate of 3% or 4% a year but farm income has
not kept pace because of the lag of farm prices. GMP increased in real
terms by 11% a year during 1965-70, while GNP per capita rose by almost
9% a year to reach US$223 in 1970. Exports rose from a low base in 1965
at an average annual rate of about 40%.
9. The population growth rate, restrained by an active official
family planning program, declined from an average 2.8% a year in the
first half of the decade to 2.2% in 1970. The economically active popu-
lation increased at 2% a year during 1965-69 while employment increased
at 2.6% a year. Thus, Korea has been able to expand its employment
opportunities sufficiently to absorb the increase in the labor force and,
at the same time, reduce the level of unemployment from about 7.4% in
1965 to 4.8%O in 1969. Since 1963 the average income of urban workers
has increased by about 60%. However, in agriculture slower growth and
adverse dormestic terms of trade meant a virtual stagnation of farm
income.
10. lWhile exports have been rising rapidly, both the expansion of
investment demand at a rate greatly in excess of the rate of increase
in domestic savings, and the low domestic content of industrial produc-
tion, have caused an equally rapid increase in imports. Consequently,
the foreign deficit on goods and services increased steadily from
$19h million in 1965 to $794 million in 1969. The external gap was
filled by an inflow of foreign capital, with a consequent rapid increase
in debt servicing obligations.
11. Rapid income growth has also led to rising prices and wages.
During 1965-69 the Seoul consumer price index rose by 11.5% a year while
the money wage of workers in the manufacturing sector increased by 24%
a year. IWholesale prices in this period increased by about 23% in
relation to external prices, whereas the exchange rate depreciated by
only 10%. In these circumstances, export growth has relied increasingly
on various incentives provided by the Government, such as tax privileges,
concessional interest rates, tariff exemptions on imported inputs, and
the privilege of importing controlled items.
12. Thus, Korea's outstanding economic performance in terms of
growth has been achieved at the cost of moderate, but continuous infla-
tion, a persistent balance of payments deficit and heavy external
indebtedness. Realizing the importance of keeping the external debt
burden within manageable limits and of containing inflation, the Govern-
ment, in late 1969, adopted a set of monetary and fiscal stabilization
measures in agreement with the IMT designed to limit the growth of
private consumption, curb credit expansion and cut down the growth of
imports and foreign borrowing.
13. The stabilization program had significant effects on the
economy in 1970, the most important being the fall in investment and
foreign borrowing and the slowdown in import growth. Fixed capital
formation at constant prices fell by almost 2% and GNP at constant
prices rose by 9.7%, compared with 15.9% in 1969. Imports of goods
and services increased by only 10% in 1970, as compared with 25% in
1969. Exports jumped by 34%, although part of this was offset by lower
service receipts, so that the increase in the receipts from goods and
services was 19% in 1970. As a result, the deficit on goods and services
account was reduced slightly from $794 million in 1969 to $779 million
in 1970. External debt of more than one year maturity incurred in 1970
amounted to $554 million, which was considerably less than the $916
million in 1969.
- h -
1h. Despite the considerable efforts by the Government, however,
the stabilization policies have not been sufficient to restore internal
financial stability or to ensure a more than temporary respite from the
mounting requirements of external finance. Private consumption still
rose by 11% in 1970, over 10% faster than GNP, and the price level went
up by at least as much as in 1969. The stabilization progran has only
temporarily eased the pressures on the country's external position. At
the end of 1970, Korea's total external debt amounted to about $2 bil-
lion and the debt service ratio exceeded 20% (11% in 1969). The
pressures are likely to persist, for Korea's economy has become geared
to a high rate of growth which cannot be slowed down abruptly without
export and employment difficulties and other severe dislocation.
15. At the last two meetings of the Consultative Group attention
was drawn to this problem, and during 1971 the Government plans to
continu.e its emphasis on export expansion while limiting increases in
external debt. The Government has set target increases of 10% for real
GNP and less than 3% for gross investment. The Central Government's
expenditure for 1971 is budgeted to increase by abou.t 18%, with some of
the increase allocated to defense in view of the reduction of U.S. forces
in Korea. Becau.se of the uncertainties in world markets and develop-
ments in Vietnam, the rate of increase in exports of goods and services
is expected to slow down. The Government has recently agreed to limita-
tions on new external debt and domestic credit expansion in the IMF
Standby Agreement for 1971.
16. The Korean planning authorities' growth objective for the
Third Five-Year Plan (1972-76) is 8.6% a year, a reduction from the 11%
achieved in 1965-70. During the Plan period, particular attention wuill
be given to the development of agriculture and the capital goods
industry. The Government will continue to give high priority to the
rapid expansion of merchandise exports which, together with a sharp
reduction in the growth of imports, is expected to contribute to a sub-
stantial improvement in Korea's balance of payments position without
leading to an increase in unemployment.
17. The projected growth rate seems likely to require a larger
investment outlay than allowed for in Korean plans. Thu.s, Korea's
requirements for external capital will continue to be high even if
policies of restraint are pursu.ed. The reasons for this are the high
level of debt service that has already been reached, the wide gap that
remains between savings and investment even after the impressive gains
in savings to a level of 16%/ of GNP in 1970 (and the plan target of
21% by 1976), and the expected deterioration in the service account of
Korea's balance of payments due to withdrawals of U.S. forces from Korea
and Korean forces from Vietnam.
18. Nevertheless, Korean capabilities for economic growth generally,
and for export expansion in particular, should not be underrated, con-
sidering the record of rapid development and effective economic manage-
ment in recent years. It seems reasonable to expect Korea to continue
on its course of rapid economic development, and it can be considered
creditworthy for further Bank loans. At the same time, considering
Korea's low level of per capita income and heavy dependence on foreign
capital, some of the assistance from the Bank Group should continue to
be on IDA terms.
19. The number of high priority projects in the public sector
having a substantial foreign exchange element is relatively limited.
Many of the projects with a large foreign exchange component are in
the private industrial sector, and are financed from private sources
and export credit agencies. The Bank Group's financing is going
increasingly into infrastructure, agriculture and education projects
which are of high priority but often have a low foreign exchange com-
ponent. In these circumstances, I consider the financing by the Bank
Group of some local expenditures appropriate.
PART III - THE PROJECT
The Transport Sector
20. The Bank Group's lending to this sector has focused on both
the physical and operational needs of both the railways and highwjays.
When the Bank Group began lending to Korea in 1962, the transport sector
was in serious need of capital investment to enable it to service the
economy which was beginning to grow after years of war and serious
inflation. There were very fews paved roads, and the railroad was handi-
capped by poor management and antiquated rolling stock and motive power.
The 1962 railways credit provided urgently needed freight and passenger
cars. Two subsequent lending operations were designed to make the
Korean National Railroad (KNR) more responsive to greatly increased
demands imposed by a rapidly industrializing economy. Besides financ-
ing additional rolling stock, the projects included a variety of con-
sultant's services to strengthen management and introduce a modern
system of operations analysis.
21. The rapid expansion in income, production and trade has put a
severe strain on the transport system. To meet the growing demand for
services, investments in the transport sector, mostly by the Goverment,
increased from $65 million in 1965 to $400 million in 1969, the latter
figure representing about 28% of total capital formation.
22. Domestic passenger and freight traffic by all modes of trans-
port increased between 1965 and 1969 at an average annual rate of about
17%. Until recently, the principal method of transport has been the
railroad, which has become a generally efficient organization with an
extensive network of lines connecting all the major population centers
in the country. However, an intensive road-building campaign started
in 1968 and road transport, which has been the major passenger carrier
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since 1965, has been gaining in importance as a freight carrier. There
has also been a rise in the amount of freighit carried by coastal shipping.
Although the share of the total amount of freight carried by the railroad
is slowly declining, the ton-km of frei_Jht carried by the KNR increased
by 5.2% in 1970 over 1969. Passenger traffic, on the other hand,
decreased by abou.t 12% over the same period as the recently opened Seoul-
Pusan expressway continued to lure travellers away from the railroad.
23. The national highways come under the authority of the Minister
of Constru.ction, wihile provincial and local roads are under the respec-
tive local au.thorities. The country has two four-lane, divided,
expressways: one covering the forty km from Seoul to the northern
port of Inchon, and the other cutting diagonally across the country
from Seoul to Pusan. However, apart from the expressways and a few
stretches of paved highways which have been constructed recently, most
of the roads are badly aligned, narrow, poorly drained, and either
roughly surfaced with gravel or unsurfaced.
24. In 1965 the Bank financed, as a grant, a transportation survey
in Korea which was carried out by a joint venture of consultants from
France and the Netherlands. The report, cormpleted at the end of 1966,
drew attention to the lack of adequate roads and recommended that the
Government emphasize road improvement in its development programs. The
report also stressed the need for carrying out major changes in highway
administration, planning, construction and maintenance. Finally, the
report called for the setting up of an organization to coordinate trans-
portation policy, which was not receiving serious attention. In 1968
the Association made a credit of $3.5 million to finance highway
organization and transport coordination studies, together with feasi-
bility stu.dies and detailed en-ineering of selected highways. As a
result of these stu.dies, carried out by consultants from France, the
Netherlands and the United States, a transport coordination mechanism
has been set up and the responsibilities and operational efficiency of
the Bureau. of Public Roads for planning was greatly improved, but only
limited progress has yet been made in improving road maintenance.
25. The expansion of domestic and foreign trade has resulted in
increasing demands on ocean and coastal shipping, which cannot be fully
met becau.se of lack of vessels and inadequate port facilities. In 1969,
coastal shipping handled 20% of the country's freight traffic. The
Ministry of Constru.ction is responsible for planning, constructing and
maintaining sixteen first class and twenty-four second class ports.
Revenues from port charges are not presently sufficient to cover
expenditures for investment, maintenance and other services. The lack
of adequate central coordination of port development has led to a
limited amount of funds being spread over a large number of ports which,
combined with a concentration of economic activities around the ports
of Pusan and Inchon, has led to considerable overcrowding of those two
ports. Expected further increases in the demand for shipping services
w^zill require a comprehensive port development prograrn for the entire
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country shaped to fit the projected traffic pattern. A UNDP-financed
survey, for which the Bank is the Executing Agency, is now under way
to develop a master plan for port development and to identify high
priority projects for possible Bank financing; this survey is expected
to be completed before the end of 1972.
26. Air traffic plays a minor role in the transport sector. The
privately-owned Korea Air Lines provides domestic and limited inter-
national flights. Less than one percent of domestic travellers went by
air in 1969 and air freight, while expanding, is still insignificant.
The Project
27. The project consists of road construction, feasibility studies,
detailed engineering, a highway maintenance study and the purchase of
maintenance equipment.
28. As can be seen on the attached map, the road to be constructed
links the major cities of Chonju, Kwangju, Sunchon, Chinju., Hasan and
Pu.san. The existing road from Chonju. to Masan is narrow, poorly aligned,
badly drained, and has a rough gravel surface, except for short paved
sections near Sunchon and Masan. The Ijiasan-Pusan section is paved, bu.t
is narrow and becoming increasingly congested. The new highway will be
built on a new alignment and will have a two-lane asphaltic concrete
pavement. It will be 56 Ion shorter than the existing road. The Masan-
Pusan alignment was chosen to connect with an intra-urban link in Pu.san
to be financed and built by the Government. Constru.ction supervision
will be carried out by consultants acceptable to the Bank.
29. Feasibility stu.dies, by consultants acceptable to the Bank, of
the possible improvement or reconstruction of about 1,400 km of national
highways are inclu.ded in the project. If found justified, detailed
engineering will be done on about 900 km of the highest priority roads,
and these could form the basis for future lending operations. Detailed
engineering will also be carried ou.t on 100 km of highways from Wonju.
to Kangnung in the northern part of the country, and on 100 km of high-
ways from iMukho to Sokcho along the north-eastern coast, for which
feasibility studies have been carried out under the 1968 technical
assistance credit. These, too, could be incorporated in a fu.ture project.
30. The project includes a stu.dy, by consultants acceptable to the
Bank, of the organization of highway maintenance and methods of carrying
it ou.t. This study vwill include: preparation of a detailed program for
the reorganization of highway maintenance, inclu.ding setting up a new
field organization of the Ministry of Constru.ction (MOC) for maintaining
national highways; preparation of a five-year maintenance program;
assessment of mechanical equipment needs for highway maintenance; and
assessment of capital and recurrent financial requirements for imple-
menting tlhe reorganization and carrying out the maintenance program.
The UNDP was approached to finance these studies, bu.t was unable to do
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so because of existing and planned technical assistance activities in
Korea. The project also includes procurement of equipment and spare
parts to assist the Government in setting up a new MOC field maintenance
organization in a pilot province.
31. Of the highway feasibility and transport coordination studies
for which an IDA technical assistance credit was made in 1968 (S-4 KO),
a small part remains to be completed. The proposed loan would finance
the cost of the uncompleted part and, at the time the loan becomes
effective, the small undisbursed amount of the 1968 credit would be
cancelled. The proposed loan would also provide funds to reimburse the
Association for the amounts already withdrawn (about $3.2 million)
under the credit for these studies.
Cost of the Project and Amount of Loan
32. Aside from providing the $3.5 million required to finance the
studies referred to in paragraph 31, the proposed loan would contribute
$51 million toward the new project. This would cover about half of the
project costs, estimated at $102.5 million as shown in detail in
Annex III. The Government will meet the other half of project costs
from the national budget. The foreign exchange component of the project
has been tentatively estimated at $45 million based on the assumiption
that foreign construction firms will wTin 25% of the contracts; the
proposed loan would, therefore, involve local currency financing of
$6 million. Since Korea has a competitive and well-organized construc-
tion industry, it is conceivable that local firms might win all of the
construction contracts; in that event the foreign component of the
project would be $43 million and the proposed loan would finance $8
million of local costs. At the other extreme, if foreign firms were
to win all of the construction contracts, the foreign component of the
project would be $53.5 million and the Government would need to provide
$2.5 million in foreign exchange.
Procurement
33. Procurement of equipment and spare parts for maintenance will
be on the basis of international competitive bidding. The Koreans
manufacture dump trucks and other road vehicles, which have a sub-
stantial local value-added component, and may possibly win contracts
amounting to about $200,000 for such equipment. If so, the Bank would
finance 90% of the total costs, the other 10% being estimated local
taxes which are not eligible costs under the project. Korean manufac-
turers of maintenance equipment will be given a 15% preference or the
prevailing customs duties, whichever is less, in the evaluation of bids.
Highway construction will be carried out on the basis of contracts
awarded after international competition. Seventeen construction firms
have already been prequalified, of which three are foreign; invitations
to bid are expected to be issued shortly. Right-of-way will be acquired
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by the Government for each contract section before awarding the construc-
tion contract. Consultants for the various studLes will be selected by
the Borrower with the concurrence of the Bank.
Implementing Agency
34. The project will be implemented by the Bureau of Public Roads
(BPR), which is part of the Ilinistry of Construction. The Ministry has
had considerable experience in civil works construction of all kinds,
and recently the BPR headquarters has been reorganized, in accordance
with consultants' recommendations under the 1968 credit, into separate
divisions dealing with planning, administration, finance, construction
and maintenance. With the help of consultants the BPR should have no
difficulty in carrying out the project.
35. The BPR is responsible for drafting highway five-year develop-
ment programs, annual budgets, design and supervision of all roads
financed by the Government, and it gives technical guidance on highway
matters to the provinces. Maintenance is the weakest aspect of the high-
way system, as responsibility for this is diffused through several
agencies at the national, provincial county and city levels. Under the
conditions of the proposed loan, a country-wide field maintenance orga-
nization under the direct responsibility of the BPR will be set up
according to an agreed timetable.
Economic Evaluation
36. The economic rate of return on the highway construction is
estimated at 28%, ranging from 220 on the less travelled sections of the
highway to 32% on the heavily travelled sections. Reductions in vehicle
operating costs and passenger time costs, due to improved running
surfaces, improved alignment, and considerable route shortenings, are
the readily quantifiable benefits used in the economic evaluation.
Benefits from a reduction in accidents,and increased operating costs
which would occur if the project were not carried out, are not included
in the calculation. Sensitivity analyrses, assuming realistic increases
in construction costs and lower traffic growth, show rates of return
which would still be acceptable.
PART IV - LEGAL INSTRUM1ENTS AND AUTIIORITY
37. The draft Loan Agreement between the Bank and the Republic of
Korea, the Report of the Committee provided for in Article III, Section
4(iii) of the Articles of Agreement and the text of a Resolution
approving the proposed loan are being distributed to the Executive
Directors separately. The draft Loan Agreement follows the general
pattern of other loan agreements relating to highway projects.
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38. I am satisfied that the proposed loan would comply with the
Articles of Agreement of the Bank.
PART V - RECOPHENDATION
39. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed
loan.
Attachments Robert S. McNamara
President
June 9, 1971
ANNEX I
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
SUNNZARY STATEMENT OF LOANS, CREDITS AND IFC INVESTIMENTS
(as of May 31, 1971)
I..OANS AND CREDITS:
Loan or Amount (U.S. $ million)
Credit No. Year Borrower Purpose Bank IDA Undisbursed
25 1962 Republic of Korea Railway 14.0 -
110 1967 Republic of Korea Railway 10.7 -
529 1968 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 5.0 0.1
S-4 1968 Republic of Korea Highway Stu.dies 3.5 o.6
600 1969 ADC Irrigation 45.o 43.8
151 1969 Republic of Korea Education 14.8 14.6
622 1969 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 20.0 11.5
669 1970 Republic of Korea Railway 40.0 37.0
183 1970 Republic of Korea Railway 15.0 14. 3
2341/ 1971 Republic of Korea Livestock 7.0 7.()
7351 1971 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 30.0 30.0
Total (less cancellations) 140.0 65.o 158.9
of which has been repaid 0.1
Total now ou.tstandlng 139.9
Amount sold 0.8
of which has been repaid - o.8
Total now held by Bank and IDA 139.1 65.0
Total undisbu.rsed 122.4 36.5 158.9
IFC INVESTEI4ENTS:
U.S. $ million
Loans Shares
1968 KDFC (Development Bank) - 0.7
1969 Honam Silk Company 1.4 0.3
1970 Atlas Paper Company 4.5 o.5
Total 5.9 1.5
1/ Not yet effective
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
COUiTRY DATA
Area 98,438 sq. km.
Population (mid year 1970) 31.79 million
Growth Rate (1970) 2.2% a/
Density (per sq. km.) 323
Gross National Product
Total (1970 at current prices) 2,562 billion won
Annual average real rate of growth (1°65-70) 11.3%
Per Capita GNP (1970) $223 equivalent
Industrial Origin of Real GNP (1970) 100%
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 26%
Mining and Manufacturing 28%
Economic Overhead and Construction 13%
Other Services 33%
(WJholesale and Retail Trade) (17%)
Gross Domestic Expenditure
c iurrent prices: as percentage of GDP) 1965 1969 1970
Consumption 94 84 84
Private 7 73 73
Public 10 11 11
Gross Capital Formation 14.8 30.4 26.6
Gross Domestic Saving 8.2 19.1 16.3
Private (Z7T) (12.7) n.a.
Public (1.8) ( 6.4) n.a.
Resource Gap 6.6 11.3 9.9
Public Finance
(current prices, in billion won)
Current Revenue 91 370 n.a.
Current Expenditure 81 248 n.a.
Surplus 10 122 n.a.
Capital Expenditure 41 231 n.a.
Receipts from Counterpart Funds 33 17 n.a.
a/ This figure has not been adjusted by the result of the 1970 census,
which shows an average annual growth rate of 1.9% between 1966 and
1970.
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1965 1969 1970
Mloney and Credit
(annual rate of change in percent)
Money Supply 33 46 41
Time and Saving Deposits 112 77 27
Total Bank Credit Outstanding 42 60 32
Price Indices (percent increase)
Consumer Prices (Seoul) 13.6 10.1 12.7
Wholesale Prices 10.0 6.8 9.1
Balance of Payments (in million US$)
IMIerchandise Exports (f.o.b.) 175 658 882
Merchandise Imports (f.o.b.) 416 1,650 1,761
Deficit -241 -992 -879
Receipts from Military Expenditures 74 249 232
Other Services, net - 27 - 51 -132
Balance on Goods & Service Account -194 -794 -779
International Liquidity (in million US$)
Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves 146 550 606
Month's Imports of Goods & Services 4 3 3
IMF Quota 18.8 50 50
IMF Drawings (outstanding) - 12.5 12.5
Net Inflow of Foreign Capital (in million US$)
Grants 203 244 178
Loans -3 634 498
Direct Investment - 16 65
Total 200 894 741
External Debt
Total ouustanding external debt (disbursed) with maturity of over one
year at the end of 1970: $1,982 million.
Amortization and interest payments on these debts during 1970 were
estimated at $321 million, or 23.4% of export earnings.
Exchange Rate (end December 1970). Banks' selling rate: 317 won to $
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1960 1965 1970a/ 1975 a/
Social Indicators
Population growth rate (%) 2.88 2.70 2.04 1.6C
Urban population growth rate
(% average for preceding 5 years) 5.8 5.8 5.0 h.6
Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 42.0 37.4 28.0 22.3
Family planning (1,000 acceptors) - 430 775 900
School enrollment, primary (%) 8 87 97 n.a.
Literacy rate (%) 71 85 90 n.a.
Unemployment rate (%) 8. 7.4 5.0 n.a.
Population per hospital bed 2,510 2,520 2,000 1,606
a/ 1970 data are preliminary estimates, 1975 data are Bank estimates.
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KOREA HIGI-JAY PROJECT
LOANJ AND PROJECT SUH4kRY
I. LOAN SUNMARY
Borrower: Republic of Korea
Amount: In various currencies equivalent to
$54.5 million
Amortization: In twenty-four years including a four year
period of grace, through semi-annual install-
ments beginning December 15, 1975 and ending
June 15, 1995.
Interest Rate: 71- per annum
Commitment Charge: 3/4 of 1% per annum
II. SECTOR DATA
Public Highways: Expressways 470 km
National highways 8,120 km
Provincial highways 10,820 km
Special city roads 2,740 km
City and county roads 15,020 km
Total 37,170 km
Type of Surface: Paved 3,120 km
Graveled 30,420 km
Unsurfaced 3,630 km
Motor Vehicle 1962 1965 1970
Statistics: Cars 5,733 13,001 57,254
Trucks 13,093 16,015 45,720
Buses 6,747 9,316 14,831
Others 2,241 3,179 3,519
Total 30,814 41,511 120,324
Traffic Data: 1969 Ton-km 1969 Pass-km
Railroad 7,325 (65.2%) 11,077 (39.3%)
Highwray 1,307 (12.1%) 16,688 (59.2%)
Coastal shipping 2,107 (19.7%) 257 ( 0.9%)
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III. PROJECT DATA
Description of The construction of 372 km of national high-
the Project: way from Chonju in the south western part of
the country- south to Xwanju then east to
Sunchon, Chinju. and Masan to Pusan, the major
port; feasibility studies of about 1,400 km
of national highwiays, detailed engineering of
about 1,100 km of national highwvays; a high-
way maintenance study; and purchases of high-
wiay maintenance equipment.
Design Standards: Two-lane asphaltic concrete pavement; speeds
from 70 kmc/h in h-lly terrain to 120 km/h in
flat terrain.
Cost Estimates: (U.S. $ million)
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ L ocal Foreign Total
A. Highway Construction 43.4 2 9 .0_/ 72.h
B. Consulting Services 5.1 8.2 13.3
C. Equiprment and Spare
Parts - 0.9 0.9
D. Contingency Allowance 9.0 6.9 15.9
Sub-total 57.5 45.0 102.5
E. Completion of 1968
Credit - 0.3 0.3
F. Credit Refunding - 3.2 3.2
Total 57.5 48.5 106 0
Allocation of
Loan: Construction $34,200,000
Consultants' Services 8,200,000
Equipment 900,000
Unallocated 7,700,000
Sub-total ,51,000,000
Completion of 1968 Credit 300,000
Credit Refunding 3,200,000
Total $54 500,0C0
Construction
Period: 1971-1975
1/ Based on the assumption that foreign construction firms will win 25%
of the contracts.
ANNEX III
Page 3
Estimated
Disbursements: Fiscal Year Amounts (U.S.$', million)
1972 7.7
1973 13.8
1974 22.3
1975 10.7
Economic Rate
of Return: 28%
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